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On the Economics of Product
Differentiation in Auditing*
Dan A. Simunic
Michael Stein
University of British Columbia

I. Introduction
Corporatefinancial statement audits have traditionally been viewed as
homogeneous across auditors. For example, the Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities ("Cohen Commission") in its Report [1978, p. 111] stated
that:
When a product or service offered by different suppliers differs
significantly to the user, or appears to differ significantly, it is easier for
one of its producers to maintain a higher, noncompetitive price. Public
accountingfirms go to considerable length to develop superior services
for their clients, but there is little effective product differentiation from the
viewpoint of the present buyer of the service (emphasis added), that is,
management of the corporation.
In support of this view, it is usual to assert that the identity of thefirm which
performs an audit is irrelevant since every examination must conform to
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and allfirm partners must be
fully professionally qualified. Thus users of financial statements have no reason
(nor basis) to distinguish among auditing firms.
At the same time, however, it has also been recognized that a company
which may have a perfectly satisfactory relationship with a local accounting firm
will often change auditors to a well-known nationalfirm when that company first
sells securities to the public. It is usually alleged that such "displacement"
occurs as a result of pressure from underwriters (see, for example, Wall Street
Journal, July 18, 1983, "Small CPA Concern Sues an Underwriter Over Loss
of Client") or because of other unwarranted "biases." For example, Arnett
and Danos [1979] use the term "perceptual barriers to viability" to describe
these "biases." Under the assumption that the services of auditingfirms are
homogeneous,
it
follows
that
professional
accounting
*The research study, upon which this paper is based, was funded by a grant from the Canadian
Certified General Accountants' Research Foundation (Vancouver, B.C.), whose support we
gratefully acknowledge. Also, we have benefited from the comments of participants in the
accounting workshops at the University of Alberta, University of British Columbia, Ohio State
University, and Washington University (St. Louis) on earlier versions of the paper.
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bodies, such as the AICPA or CICA, should strive to eliminate "biases,"
perhaps by "educating" managers, underwriters, and other financial statement
users. However, if we drop the homogeneity assumption, then auditor
displacement at the time of an initial public offering of securities (to the extent
such displacement actually occurs) may simply be evidence of rational economic
behavior.

1.1 The Product Differentiation

Hypothesis

Recently, several researchers [Simunic, 1980; De Angelo, 1981(a) and
1981(b); Dopuch and Simunic, 1980 and 1982] have suggested that audit
services, like most products, are likely to be differentiated.
De Angelo [1981(a)] argues for the existence of audit quality differentiation,
in the sense of systematic differences in auditor independence, essentially as
follows. First, she assumes that the production of audit services for a specific
client over time is subject to a learning curve. Given this condition, if,
whenever a client changes auditors, there is competitive bidding among
potential suppliers, then the first year's audit fee will be less than the avoidable
cost in that year. This is referred to as "low balling." In other words, the
auditor is "forced" (through the competitive bidding process) to invest in the
client by passing through into his initial fee bid the discounted future cost
savings due to learning. The investment will be recovered (along with at least a
normal return) through fees in subsequent years which exceed avoidable costs,
and these "excess fees" constitute client-specific quasi-rents.
With respect to auditor independence, the important feature of this
argument is that the quasi-rents can be lost (and the auditor earn less than a
normal return) should a client unexpectedly change auditors. Thus, other things
being equal, the existence of client-specific quasi-rents gives a client more
bargaining power vis-a-vis the incumbent auditor, potentially impairing that
auditor's independence. However, De Angelo argues, other things are not
equal in that an incumbent auditor who is tempted to "cheat'' in order to please
one client must also consider the possible loss of his other clients, should his
malfeasance subsequently be discovered. Hence a large audit firm with many
audits and earning large aggregate client-specific quasi-rents faces a higher
potential opportunity loss from "cheating'' to retain a client than would a small
audit firm with few clients. The aggregate quasi-rents are said to constitute a
"collateral bond" against auditor "cheating." As a result, auditor independence will be positively correlated with audit firm size.
Note that De Angelo's argument is essentially mechanistic, being driven by
an assumed audit learning curve and competition in the bidding process. Many
objections can be raised against the reasonableness of this scenario, including
the fact that the existence of a significant learning curve in auditing has not been
empirically demonstrated.1 In addition, De Angelo ignores the demand for
differentiated audit services, except in the narrow sense that a client is not
willing to pay the cost of an independent audit to an auditor who, in fact, is not
perceived as supplying such audits (i.e., a "cheater").
In a second paper, De Angelo [1981(b)] broadens her notion of audit quality
into "the market assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a)
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discover a breach in the client's accounting system and (b) report the breach"
[p. 186]. Differences in quality supplied are still motivated by differences in
auditor collateral bonds; that is, audit quality is correlated with auditfirm size.
In addition, De Angelo conjectures that the demand for differences in audit
quality arises from differences in agency costs across clients. Several of the
linkages (particularly the connection between the size of the collateral bond and
the probability of discovering a breach) in that paper are very vague. However,
some of the arguments (discussed later) are consistent with the present work.
At about the same time, Dopuch and Simunic [1980; 1982] proposed a
demand based model of product differentiation wherein audit services possessed two characteristics valued by a company's top management: a contribution to organization control and credibility with externalfinancial statement
users. They argue that credibility is simply associated with an auditor's
reputation or brand name. The demand for credibility is assumed to arise when
there is an asymmetry of information between top management and investors
about the honesty of top management. In this situation, a costly audit by a
credible auditor can either signal management's honesty to investors or reduce
agency costs by restricting top management's ability to conceal, through
misrepresentation in the financial statements, the consequence of actions taken
which were in the best interests of top management ("self-serving behavior")
but not shareholders. Dopuch and Simunic argue further that top managements' utility functions and opportunity sets for "self-serving behavior" likely
vary across companies. Hence, "the market is not likely to be characterized by
a single value of credibility demanded and supplied" [1982, p. 413]. Note that
an important element of any market characterized by information asymmetry is
the question of observability. Thus, Dopuch and Simunic argue further that
auditor credibility must be associated with an observable characteristic, such as
the name of the auditor, rather than the undisclosed details of the audit
examination.
These arguments are silent as to the specific rank ordering(s) of auditors on
a credibility dimension and the theory is sufficiently general to allow different
orderings of auditfirms in different circumstances. For example, auditors may
possess different local, regional, or client industry-specific reputations. However, from the observed dominance of the Big Eightfirms in the market for
audits of publicly held companies, Dopuch and Simunic infer that audits of such
companies by Big Eight firms are more credible than audits by smaller firms.

1.2 Previous Tests for Product Differentiation
Several researchers have attempted to empirically test this "product
differentiation hypothesis," generally in the simplified two-class form wherein
audits by Big Eight firms are hypothesized to be of higher quality than audits by
non-Big Eight firms.
Nichols and Smith [1983] examined the stock market reaction to auditor
changes between auditor classes during the years 1973-79 by 51 companies
whose common shares were listed on either the New York or American Stock
Exchanges. In a series of tests, they found that while abnormal returns were in
the directions predicted by the product differentiation hypothesis (i.e., negative
residuals were associated with Big Eight to non-Big Eight changes while
71

positive residuals were associated with non-Big Eight to Big Eight changes),
the mean differences were not statistically significant. They concluded that the
magnitude of any market revaluation of the firm arising from a change in auditor
class may not be detectable using conventional methods, particularly for large,
listed companies.
Shockley and Holt [1983] used multidimensional scaling to examine how a
sample of bank chief financial officers rated the Big Eight CPAfirms. The basic
issue tested was whether or not purchasers of audit services could systematically differentiate among the Big Eightfirms (i.e., whether there was product
differentiation within the Big Eight). Shockley and Holt found that bankers
tended to differentiate among these auditfirms largely on the basis of market
shares within the banking industry. They therefore suggested that industry
expertise may be a source of audit quality differentiation.
Healy and Lys [1983] used the product differentiation hypothesis to explain
the acquisition by Big Eightfirms of smaller auditfirms. They conjectured that
auditor mergers may be the least costly method for the clients of the acquired
firm to change the quality of their auditing. However, not all clients of the
acquired firm are likely to demand a change in audit quality at the time of the
merger. Hence, any systematic differences between those clients which stay
with the acquiring Big Eightfirm and those which revert to a smaller auditor
would represent factors associated with the demand for audit quality. Their test
consisted of an examination of switching vs. non-switching clients of J.K.
Lasser & Co., following its merger into Touche Ross, and the clients of S.D.
Leidesdorf & Co., following that firm's acquisition by Ernst & Whinney. The
results were weakly consistent with the product differentiation hypothesis in
that switching vs. non-switching clients differed on certain plausible dimensions, including size and leverage. However, other plausible explanatory
variables, including changes in client capital structure, were found to be
insignificantly different between the two groups.
Palmrose [1984] investigated the association between agency cost variables
and the use of different classes of auditors. She hypothesized that the higher
the expected level of agency costs arising from a certain ownership-management structure in a company, the higher the level of audit quality which will be
demanded. The test consisted of a series of logistic regressions of auditor
choice (Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight) on a set of potential explanatory variables
which measured expected agency costs (i.e., client size, degree of separation
between ownership and management, leverage, and the existence of management compensation plans tied to accounting numbers). The sample consisted of
a cross-section of 276 companies classified by industry. The results were
inconclusive and somewhat anomalous in that client size was the only consistently significant explanatory variable (i.e., the clients of the Big Eight firms
tended to be larger). In addition, leverage was the only other variable which
was sometimes significant, but in the wrong direction. That is, the clients of
Big Eightfirms tended to have lower leverage (lower expected agency costs),
which was contrary to the hypothesis.
One direct implication of product differentiation in auditing is that there
should be related systematic differences in audit prices. As pointed out by
Simunic [1980], the market for audits is a hedonic market wherein differentiated products are not observable directly, but rather are revealed by differ72

ences in prices associated with differences in observed product characteristics.
Thus, if Big Eightfirms deliver a higher quality of service than non-Big Eight
firms then, other things held constant, audit prices should likewise vary
between the two groups.
The existing evidence on this point is mixed. Simunic [1980] found that
prices charged by the Big Eight firms in the United States were, on average,
not significantly different and perhaps somewhat lower than non-Big Eight firm
prices, across all sizes of clients. Note that his sample consisted of a cross
section of 397 audits of companies ranging in size from $500,000 in assets (and
sales) to about $10 billion in assets (and sales). Using a pooled cross section of
136 Australian companies, Francis [1984], on the other hand, found that prices
charged by Big Eightfirms were significantly higher than prices charged by nonBig Eight firms. This is consistent with the results reported by Taffler and
Ramalinggam [1982] using data from the United Kingdom. However, in addition
to the institutional differences between countries, the companies in Francis'
sample were significantly smaller (by about a factor of 10) than those in
Simunic's U.S. sample. In a subsequent paper, Francis and Stokes [1985]
report that the positive difference between Big Eight and non-Big Eight firm
prices seems to be largely confined to the very smallest companies in their
sample (mean assets of $1.8 million Australian dollars). This leads the authors
to speculate that scale economies to Big Eight firms and consequent lower
production costs may "swamp" the price effects of product differentiation,
.except for audits of very small companies where "scale economies are less
likely to exist" [p. 12].
The conflicting nature of this evidence may, at least partially, be due to the
difficulties of inferring audit prices from audit fee data. An audit fee, which alone
is directly observable, can be thought of as the product of price times audit
quantity purchased by the client company. Hence in a cross section (and time
series) of fees, sources of extraneous differences in audit quantities must be
carefully controlled before inferences about prices can be made. While there is
now considerable evidence about the major determinants of audit fees [e.g.,
Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1983; Maher, Broman, Colson and Tiessen, 1985],
the specifications of existing models are no doubt imperfect and omitted
variables may bias regression coefficients. In addition, many audit fee determinants are correlated with company size, the relation between fees and size is
nonlinear, and, because of the dominance of the Big Eight firms in the audits of
large companies, it is very difficult to obtain a sample of audits wherein the
clients of Big Eight and non-Big Eight firms are well matched on a size
dimension. Hence, a failure to properly control the nonlinear client size effect
on fees can easily lead to a biased coefficient on an auditor identity variable.
Add to these econometric difficulties the possible confounding effects of scale
economies to large auditors, and it is not surprising that no clear evidence on
product differentiation has yet emerged using audit fee data.
In summary, the empirical tests of the product differentiation hypothesis
have, to date, been suggestive but inconclusive. But, this is not surprising
given the early stage of the research on this topic, as well as the economics of
auditing in general.

73

1.3 Plan of this Paper
The economic foundations for the product differentiation hypothesis in
auditing are only roughly and incompletely sketched out in the existing
literature. Our objective in this paper is to develop these foundations, which
serve as a basis for a theory of auditor choice by top management of a company.
Note that the auditor choice decision is non-trivial only under the hypothesis
that auditor services are somehow differentiated. The assumption of homogeneous audit services implies that the assignment of auditors to clients is random
or simply a function of auditor cost conditions. For example, if only the largest
auditingfirms are fully able to exploit available economies of scale due to input
indivisibilities, then there is no meaningful auditor choice and these largest
firms will eventually (in a world of transaction costs) "sweep" the market for
audits.
In Section II, using Lancaster's [1966] "characteristics" framework, we
begin by analyzing the attributes of the audit service which may be valued by
top management. In doing so, we consider the distinction between audit quality
and quantity and their relation to audit service inputs. We then analyze the
"product location" decision of auditors, and develop the argument that the
credibility of an audit is communicated to externalfinancial statement users
(e.g., prospective shareholders and creditors) through an audit firm's brand
name. Thus it is the brand name which has ex ante value to top management
when seeking to influence the decisions of users. We conclude this section with
a discussion of some welfare implications of product differentiation.
In Section III, we associate auditor credibility with the power of an auditor's
tests (in a statistical sense), and analyze the sources of demand for different
levels of credibility. We argue that an auditor's brand name induces a Bayesian
revision of users' prior probability distributions that financial statements
contain material error. In a world of rational users who can "price protect"
themselves when transacting with management, cross sectional differences in
the prior probability of error and the wealth effects of error will cause top
managers of different companies to demand different credibility levels. We
examine the role of future rents and quasi-rents in "enforcing" the delivery of
a particular expected power of test, and consider the implication of our analysis
for rates of litigation ("hit rates") which can be expected to occur across audit
firms whose credibility varies. Finally, we compare our analysis to that of De
Angelo and present some examples to illustrate the main ideas. The paper
closes with some concluding observations and comments.

II. Economics of Product Differentiation
2.1 Basic Concepts
Consistent with the traditional view of financial statement audits, the
standard assumption in microeconomic analysis has been that the products
produced byfirms in a particular industry or market are homogeneous. That is,
within an industry, consumers cannot distinguish the product produced byfirm i
from that produced byfirm j. More formally, this assumption is expressed by
the condition that the cross price elasticity of demand for the product of the i t h
firm in an industry with respect to the price of product of the j th firm in the
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industry is infinite, or the products are perfect substitutes.2 An implication of
this assumption is that a single price must prevail within the market.
Chamberlain [1933] was the first economist to suggest that no two firms
are likely to make precisely the same product, even though they operate in the
same industry. He coined the term "monopolistic competition" to describe a
market where there are many sellers, each one producing a somewhat
differentiated product. If, on the other hand, there are only a few firms in the
industry, the market can be described as a differentiated products oligopoly.
Note that differentiated products are assumed to be strong substitutes, but not
perfect substitutes for each other. That is, their cross price elasticities are finite
and relatively large. If the products are very weak substitutes in demand (cross
price elasticities approach zero), then the products are no longer simply
differentiated, but the firms can be thought of as operating in different
industries. In fact, a criticism of Chamberlain's work has been that the notion of
differentiated products is really nothing new, but simply causes us to think
more deeply about which group of firms ought to be considered an industry
[e.g., Stigler, 1968]!
Following Chamberlain, and the essentially concurrent work by Hotelling
[1929] on spacial duopoly, there were few contributions to the economics of
product differentiation until the work of Lancaster [1966; 1971] on the nature of
product characteristics. In considering exactly how products may be differentiated, Lancaster proposed the notion that a commodity is not desired in and of
itself, but rather for the bundle of utility bearing characteristics it contains. For
example, a specific brand and model of automobile provides not only the
obvious characteristic transportation, but also some amount of the characteristics safety, social prestige, driving entertainment, pleasant appearance, etc. Each
of these characteristics commands an implicit price in a market, and the
observed market price of the commodity (e.g., automobile) will be a linear
combination of the measured quantities of each of the component characteristics. Since quantities of characteristics vary across products, observed prices
will also vary. Hence in order to compare product prices, construct price
indices over time, or test hypotheses about market behavior using price data, it
is necessary to control for differences in product characteristics. A way to do
this is to estimate the coefficients of a hedonic regression function where
product price is the dependent variable and quantities of characteristics are the
independent variables. This is essentially the theoretical rationale underlying
the studies of audit fees discussed in Section 1.3
The notion of characteristics suggests that there are two basic ways in
which products can be differentiated. In the simplest case, the industry's
product contains only one characteristic, but products of variousfirms differ in
the amount of the characteristic each contains. This situation can be described
as vertical product differentiation and it implies that products can be ordered on
a single dimension, which can be labeled product quality. The more general
case, where the product possesses many characteristics and producers differ in
the amount of each characteristic their product contains, can be called
horizontal product differentiation. Note that in this case, the description of each
firm's product is a k component vector of quantities (where k is the number of
characteristics or dimensions) and, in general, the products of various suppliers
cannot be ordered.
75

2.2 Demand for Audit Service Characteristics
Before proceeding further, it is useful to relate these concepts to the audit
services market. First, it is important to recognize that audit services are not a
consumption good, but rather a factor of production. That is, neither audit
services nor their component characteristics are direct objects of utility to any
ultimate consumer, and the demand for audit services is not the outcome of a
standard constrained utility maximization problem. Thus, the demand for
differentiated
audit services cannot arise from a simple assumption that
consumers vary in their tastes, preferences, and incomes.
As a factor of production or intermediate good, the demand for audit
services is derived from the objective function of the top management of the
audited company. We assume that this objective is to maximize own expected
utility.4 Some insight into the characteristics of the audit service which may be
valued by (or increase the wealth of) top management can be derived by
considering various possible relationships between top management, shareholders, and creditors.
Top managers are also owners and there are no creditors
These assumptions describe a smaller closely-held company with no debt.
Will audit services be demanded at all in this situation? The answer would seem
to depend crucially on the size and complexity of the company and the resulting
degree to which top managers can personally monitor the various activities of
their subordinates. The less their personal control over the organization, the
more likely an outside audit would be valuable to top management. The audit
service would be part of the control system over the information produced
within the organization, and hence the company'sfinancial statements. This
demand, which arises from the internal agency problems of an organization,
may be termed a control demand. Therefore, a plausible audit service
characteristic along which auditors can be differentiated is the contribution of
the audit to the organization's internal control system.
Top managers are separate from owners and there are no creditors
These assumptions describe a publicly held company with an all-equity
capital structure (ignoring government regulations and any mandatory audit
requirement). There is now an agency relationship between top management
and outside shareholders.5 Given the existence of this agency relationship,
there is likely to be a demand for an independent attestation (audit) as to the
truthfulness of the information reported by top management to the outside
shareholders, and, in general, both parties (groups) might benefit from such an
audit [Beaver, 1981]. The key attribute of the audit service is likely to be its
credibility as perceived by the shareholders. Hence, this is a second characteristic or dimension along which audit services can be differentiated.
Effects

of the introduction of debt into the capital structure

The issuance of debt by a closely held company creates an agency
relationship between the debtholder(s) as principal and an owner-manager as
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agent. After the issuance of debt, the owner-manager is motivated to take
actions which increase the value of the equity, but decrease the value of the
debt. A major potential source of such agency costs is adoption of an
investment policy in which projects with a high variance but low expected net
present value are substituted for lower variance but higher net present value
projects [Jensen and Meckling, 1976].6 Note that the owner-manager will
exclusively earn the possible high returns from high variance projects, but
shares the risk of possible low returns or losses with the debtholders. This
agency relationship is likely to give rise to the use of restrictive covenants in
debt agreements [see Smith and Warner, 1979] as well as a demand for
independent attestation to verify both the compliance with these agreements
and the truthfulness of generalfinancial information reported by the ownermanager to the debtholders. As with public shareholders, credibility or
reputation is thus likely to be an important audit service attribute. Of course,
both the manager-shareholder and manager-debtholder agency relationships
will exist simultaneously if debt is issued by a publicly held company, reinforcing
the demand for audit service credibility.
In summary, two major audit service characteristics arise from a consideration of the possible organization structure of the audited company:
1) the contribution of the audit to organization control, and
2) the credibility of the audit as perceived by shareholders and creditors.
The importance of these two characteristics was confirmed in a recent study of
881 small, closely held U.S. companies by O'Keefe and Barefield [1985]. Of the
companies who voluntarily purchased audits in this sample (132 companies or
15 percent), 57 percent listed "enhances credibility (of financial statements)
with outside users" as the most important reason for the purchase, while 46
percent listed "augments internal control" as the second most important
reason.7 Moreover, other reasons for the purchase were mentioned only
infrequently (e.g., 12/17 percent listed "limits liability" as a primary/secondary reason).
A third possible characteristic which top management may value is the
scope of the product line offered by an auditfirm, in particular the availability of
various management consulting type services from the audit supplier. Such
product availability reduces management's search costs when seeking to
acquire consulting services. In addition, it is often claimed that production of
auditing creates a knowledge externality or spillover which reduces the costs of
consulting services when the services are produced jointly. This issue was
analyzed and tested by Simunic [1984] who found that the pricing of audit
services is consistent with the hypothesis that knowledge spills over from
auditing to consulting. Thus, managers in certain circumstances may be better
off by purchasing the audit servicefrom a supplier with a wide product line.
However, this need not be true in all situations. For example, in the data set on
publicly held companies underlying Simunic [1980; 1984], 235 of 381 companies
or 62 percent purchased no consulting servicefrom their auditor over a threeyear period.8 Further, of the 277 companies audited by a Big Eightfirm, 163 or
59 percent purchased no consulting service from their auditfirm during the
period. Hence, the value of wide service scope to managers can be assumed to
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vary, creating a third characteristic along which auditfirms can be differentiated.

2.3 Distinctions Between Characteristic Quantities, Quality of
Service, and the Quantity of Inputs and Output
Based on this analysis, a description of the audit service purchased by a
particular client9 from a particular audit firm requires, in principle, the
specification of a vector of quantities of three service characteristics:
{control, credibility, product line} or {c1; c 2 , c 3 }.
A unit of each characteristic is assumed to be costly to produce. For example,
the offering of a line of consulting services which may or may not be demanded
by a particular client is costly to the auditfirm. Or the development of a certain
credibility10 level with outside shareholders and creditors is also costly.
Therefore, each service characteristic commands a positive implicit price—say
λ1, λ2 and λ3 — in the market.
With differentiated audit services, quality of service comparisons can be
made using any dimension of interest if the quantities of the suppressed
characteristics are at least equal. For example, an audit service described by
the vector {2, 8, 5} is of higher quality than the service {2, 5, 5}, of lower
quality than the service {2, 9, 5} and not comparable in quality to the service
{1, 10, 5}.
In addition to the quantities of service characteristics from which quality of
service rankings can sometimes be made, auditing also has a pure quantity
dimension. This is so because audit service contexts differ radically across
companies. We have argued that some differences in client contexts are the
basis for a demand for differentiated audit services. However, other contextual
differences lead to supplier choice and the delivery of a certain quantity of
service on the basis of supplier efficiency considerations in a context taken
alone. To make this distinction meaningful, it is necessary to clearly specify a
base level or standard service. All client context differences which affect the
resources expended by a supplier in providing the base level service are
sources of pure audit quantity differences. Conversely, any context differences
which lead to different choices of service vectors, {c1, c 2 , c 3 }, are sources of
product differentiation among auditors.
The base level service is defined by the simple purchase of an audit
opinion.11 If management only values an audit opinion per se (perhaps because
an audit is mandated by law), then management would simply choose the leastcost producer in the circumstances. This characterization of the problem is the
basis for the traditional view that all auditors deliver the same homogeneous
product—an appropriate audit opinion. Empirically, it motivates a search for
auditor scale economies [e.g., Danos and Eichenseher, 1982]. The hypothesis
of product differentiation motivates a search beyond the opinion to distinguishing service characteristics. Of course, management still demands an efficient
producer of a particular characteristic vector, but auditor choice is no longer a
cost minimization problem. Rather, it requires explicit recognition of a benefit
function to top management.
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If the pure quantity of auditing is measured by q, then an audit service fee
can be denoted as
F = (λ1C1 + λ 2 c 2 + λ 3 c 3 )q.
While audit fee data are not examined in this paper, some examples of fee
determination are useful to illustrate the ideas. Suppose that a client wishes to
purchase a base level service—an audit opinion. Management deems the audit
valueless in controlling the organization and has no use for consulting services.
Since some auditor must sign the opinion, credibility or c 2 can arbitrarily be
assigned a minimum value of 1. Hence the characteristic vector demanded
would be the base level {0,1,0} and the fee would be
F = λ2q
where q depends on company size, complexity, etc. Consider now an identical
company, except that management values the auditor's ability to perform
certain consulting services as needed. Say the desired characteristic vector is
{0, 1, 1}. Note that this is a higher quality service. The service fee would be
F = (λ 2 + λ3)q where F > F .
The fee now reflects the presence of both attributes and is scaled by q. Finally,
suppose there exists another identical company in terms of size, complexity,
etc. whose top management chooses an audit service which improves organization control, has a higher credibility with outsiders than the base level, and is
obtained from a supplier who is capable of rendering certain consulting services
as needed. Say the vector {2, 3,1} characterizes this service. The fee for this
service, which is of higher quality than in the previous case, would be
F' = (2λ2 + 3λ 3 + λ3)q where F' > F > F .
What is the role of service inputs in this fee model?12 The outputs of the
audit service are the quantities {c1, c 2 , c 3 } and q. These outputs are related to
inputs through a production function, but the relationship need not be simple.
For example, it seems likely that control and credibility are largely joint
products, thus restricting the values c1 and c 2 can assume. On the other hand,
the breadth of the available product line is not a function of variable audit
service inputs but requires the incurrence of a fixed cost by the auditing firm.
Higher levels of available services presumably are associated with higher fixed
costs. Thus, distinguishing between inputs and output is important in conceptualizing the audit service; but detail specification of the input/output relationship is not possible, nor usually necessary.

2.4 Product Location in Characteristics Space
If audit services are differentiated, then the question arises as to what
service designs will be offered for sale in the market? Also, can a given audit
firm be expected to supply a single type of service (i.e., a vector with specific
characteristics {c1, c 2 , c3}) or simultaneously supply a variety of characteristic
vectors? These are important issues from the point of view of both purchasers
and producers. Audit firms presumably want to design services so as to
maximize economic rents; conversely, the services (and prices) which emerge
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in market equilibrium affect the welfare of purchasers. In the economics
literature, these issues are described as "product location" decisions since the
insights are frequently derived by analogy from formal models of spatial
competition.
Consider first the question of whether a producer will offer a single or
multiple characteristic vectors. For typical goods, it is common to observe a
company which produces and markets a variety of product types. For example,
in a study of product characteristics of the U.K. fertilizer industry, Shaw [1982]
found that 69 different compound fertilizers were available in 1978 from three
major producers. These products largely differed only in composition with
respect to the three plant nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash. In this
setting, labeling presumably allows the consumer to choose the most suitable
product for a particular situation, and the identity of the sellingfirm may well be
irrelevant.
As product characteristics become more subtle and thus more difficult to
enumerate and measure, a company will use separate brand names to identify
products with specific sets of characteristics. For example, automobile manufacturers sell a variety of models which presumably differ as to the amounts of
the characteristics—transportation, safety, prestige, etc.—each provides. In
the limit, if a company is (somehow) precludedfrom developing a multiplicity of
brands, the relevant brand will be the name of the company itself. In that
situation, where the nature of the product precludes direct communication of
component characteristics and thefirm name is the brand, each supplier will
produce a product with a single set of characteristic quantities.
Turning to the location decision, rent seeking suppliers can be expected to
locate (i.e., choose a vector) in response to demand and the location choices of
other suppliers. Unfortunately, the economics literature offers few general
results on equilibrium location choices, as solutions are very sensitive to
alternative plausible assumptions about the behavior of competitors, the nature
of the space in which competition occurs, and the distribution of customers
[Eaton and Lipsey, 1975]. However, some insights can be obtained by
considering the basic factors which affect the location decision [see Waterson,
1984].
Three cost elements enter into economic models of location:
a. a transportation cost per unit of distance,
b. production costs which can consist of afixed and/or variable component,
and
c. relocation costs.
The existence of fixed costs is crucial to the solution. If there are no fixed costs
of production, then firms will simply produce at all points at which there are
customers. That is, demand will be perfectly satisfied without the incurrence of
transportation costs. The assumption of fixed costs implies that the number of
suppliers must be limited to maintain profitability; hence customers will vary in
distance from the nearest supplier. A second key assumption concerns the
possibility of relocation. That is, once a supplier chooses a location, are there
costs of relocation? In general, if relocation is costless but there are fixed
production costs, there is no unique equilibrium solution [Eaton and Lipsey,
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1975]. Conversely, if initial location choice is irreversible and suppliers enter a
market sequentially, then the equilibrium location pattern will be symmetrical
for a uniform distribution of customers. For example, if buyers are uniformly
scattered along a line segment of fixed length, sellers will anticipate that
unusually large "gaps" in the market will befilled by competitors and hence
will array themselves at equally spaced intervals [Waterson, 1984]. However, if
customers are located in clusters, a closer packing of suppliers will occur in
areas of high demand density with the "gaps" increasing in width in areas of
low demand density [Shaw, 1982].
Let us now relate these ideas to the audit service. If different quantities of
control, credibility, and product line scope can be readily observed and
measured by top management (i.e., these attributes are like nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potash!), it would seem that each auditfirm can produce a
multiplicity of characteristic vectors to meet (perhaps imperfectly if there are
fixed costs) client demand. However, even if top management possesses such
complete information, the situation is complicated by the fact that credibility is
purchased solely to influence the decisions of shareholders and creditors. These
outside parties, who may be numerous and geographically scattered, are very
unlikely to possess complete information. We therefore conclude that, for
them, the audit firm's brand name or reputation is the relevant measure of
credibility. However, brand name will be less important for the other two
characteristics where the outputs (and inputs) can be more easily observed by
top management, who directly value these characteristics. An implication is
that each auditfirm will be identified with a single level of credibility at any
moment in time, but may offer a multiplicity of control levels and, perhaps,
product scope levels.13 In the next section, we analyze the auditor choice
decision given this information asymmetry and develop more precisely our
notions of credibility, brand name, and reputation.
With respect to the product location decision of auditors, thefirst step is to
identify the analogues of transportation, production, and relocation costs. Note
that transportation costs are incurred whenever suppliers and customers are
physically separated. Thus, in a characteristic space, an analogous cost arises
if, given the equilibrium distribution of characteristic vectors of suppliers, top
management incurs an opportunity loss of wealth or utility. For example,
suppose managers rationally want to purchase an audit of near zero credibility,
but no such service is available on the market. Acquiring a credible audit
implies an opportunity loss or transportation cost. 14 Or suppose management
wants an audit of certain credibility from a supplier who also specializes in a
certain type of consulting service, but no such supplier exists. Again, an
opportunity loss is incurred. From the previous discussion, note that such
opportunity losses will arise only if there arefixed costs of producing at certain
locations, that is, particular characteristic vectors.
Since very little is known about the production functions of public accounting firms, we can only speculate about the importance of fixed costs in
producing a level of control, credibility, and product scope. However, it seems
likely that there are significant fixed costs associated with a firm's capital
commitments. The most important of these will be the technology adopted and
the human capital (expertise) of professional staff. For example, Kinney [1985]
has argued that auditing firms can be categorized on an audit technology
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dimension into "unstructured" vs. "structured" firms. Thefirst group tends
to minimize the constraints imposed on professional judgment whereas the
second uses statistical methods, decision aids, etc. to constrain and "improve"
judgment. It seems plausible that fixed costs increase as "structure" increases. Fixed costs are also likely to increase as the professional staff
becomes more specialized (narrow). For example, the offering of a specialized
consulting service to clients, such as industrial engineering for plant design and
cost control, no doubt adds to an audit firm's fixed costs.
Two conclusions follow from this discussion. First, auditingfirms probably
vary in the level of fixed costs they incur. Second, the higher thefixed cost
commitment, the less flexible the firm will be in producing a variety of
characteristic vectors. This seems to be the basis for the often heard claim that
small audit firms are moreflexible in meeting a client's demands, although large
firms may be more efficient in performing specific, complex tasks. With respect
to the three audit service characteristics, fixed costs can be important in all
cases. As a result, all possible combinations of control, credibility, and product
scope are not likely to be available in the market.
Finally, consider the costs incurred by an auditfirm when attempting to
move from one characteristic vector to another vector. Typically, relocation
costs are those fixed production costs which are "sunk" at a specific location.
These costs may be particularly high when information about characteristics is
conveyed by the brand name. Schmalensee [1978] points out that, for
consumer goods, the "repositioning" of brands can be so costly that it is
frequently cheaper to simply abandon an established brand whose sales have
fallen to low levels and introduce a new brand. Again, while there is no
empirical evidence on the point, such costs are likely to exist in auditing. For
example, if an audit firm invests in structured technologies which facilitate the
production of high levels of control and credibility but are unnecessary for
producing low levels of these characteristics, an attempted movefrom the high
level will be costly. Or, if afirm enters into an employment contract with a
specialized consultant, firing the consultant will be costly. Perhaps most
important, as with consumer goods, it may be very costly for a firm to change
the credibility level associated with its brand name. In fact, high costs of
directly relocating a brand may be an important motivation for mergers
between CPA firms.
If costs of relocation are substantial (therefore locations more or less fixed),
the characteristic vectors of auditfirms will tend to be separated. For example,
there will be an array of credibility levels associated withfirm brands. Thus any
grouping of suppliers into broad classes such as Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight is
necessarily arbitrary and should be tested for within-group homogeneity. Note,
however, that auditfirm product vectors will tend to be clustered in response
to concentrations of client demand.

2.5 Welfare

Implications of Product Differentiation

When dealing with differentiated products, a social welfare question which
can be asked is this: given a location equilibrium, will the variety of characteristic vectors offered for sale in the market be optimal?15 This evaluation involves
a trade-off. On the one hand, the greater the variety of characteristic vectors,
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the better the market caters to diverse consumer tastes and preferences. On
the other hand, the assumption of differentiated products (imperfect substitutes) implies that the demand curves faced by suppliers are downward
sloping and equilibrium must occur where average production costs are still
falling. Thus differentiated products imply a loss of efficiency. Unfortunately,
the welfare properties of the free market solution depend on the specific values
of parameters. That is, in general too many or too few product varieties may be
produced and sold [Friedman, 1983]. Hence beyond these general statements
the economic literature offers no conclusion about the welfare implications of
product differentiation in auditing from the usual perspective.
However, a somewhat different question appears to be more relevant here;
namely, is it socially desirable for auditors to offer differentiated services at all
to their clients? Since the demand for auditing is not a consumption demand but
rather is derived from top management's objective function which is assumed
to be maximization of own wealth or utility, are demand differences, in some
sense, socially legitimate? There is no special problem if top management's
objective is consistent with the objectives of shareholders and creditors. Such
mutuality of interests would occur with respect to the characteristics control
and product line scope. That is, all three parties are presumably interested in
efficient monitoring of organization subordinates and efficient acquisition and
utilization of consulting services. However, the credibility characteristic is
clearly different in that the purpose of auditor credibility is to ameliorate an
agency problem between top management and the other two groups. Thus, the
legitimacy of product differentiation on this dimension is likely to be a
controversial, but interesting question. To answer the question, we must
analyze the nature, role, and demand for credibility in more detail.

III. Auditor Credibility and Auditor Choice
3.1 Nature of Audit Service Credibility
Dopuch and Simunic [1982] describe auditor credibility as follows (p. 407):
An auditor's attestation to the authenticity of financial statements adds
credibility to these top management assertions. Credibility is judged by
users. More credible reporting simply means a report is more likely to
be truthful or lack intentional misrepresentation. . . . Shareholders will
rationally expect that attestation by a credible auditor reduces the
probability that management is able to successfully conceal 'self-serving
behavior.'
This is consistent with both Watts and Zimmerman [1980] and De Angelo
[1981(b)] who argue that the ex ante value of an audit to shareholders and
creditors depends on these individuals' (or "the market's") perception of the
joint probability that a given auditor will discover errors and irregularities in a
set of financial statements and report those findings truthfully (without
omission or bias).16 Recall that this is also De Angelo's definition of audit
quality.
The concept can be made more precise by considering a simplified Bayesian
model of an auditor's decision problem. Assume an auditor faces a two-action,
two-state reporting decision where the states of nature are: (s1) — the financial
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statements are correct, and (s2) — thefinancial statements are materially
incorrect. The available actions are: (a1) — give an unqualified opinion, or (a2)
— give an appropriately qualified or adverse opinion. Assume the auditor has
performed all the usual audit tests at a certain intensity level, measured by n,
which yield possible signals, t. Further, the test results, t, indicate the
presence of only immaterial errors. Then the posterior probability of s 2 will be:
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)
p"(s2|t,n) =

1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)+ 1(t|n,s1)(1 -p'(s 2 ))

where
p" = a posterior distribution on the states
p' = a prior distribution on the states
1 = a likelihood function
This expression can be simplified if it is assumed that the auditor cannot commit
a Type I error. That is, if the auditor receives a signal, t, which indicates
material errors are present, he will keep sampling. If the state of nature is s 1 ,
additional evidence should lead to the discovery that sampling error is
responsible for the faulty signal. Thus, 1(t|n,s1) = 1 and 17
p"(s2|t,n) =

1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)
1(t|n,s2)p'(s2)+ (1-p'(s 2 ))

Assume that, given p"(s2), the auditor will take action a 1 .
A measure of the credibility of thefinancial statements (the "package")
reflecting all available information about management, the auditor, and organizational and environmental factors would be 1-p"(s 2 ). On the other hand, a
measure of the credibility of the auditor, or audit service, is 1 - 1(t|n,S2), which
is the power of the auditor's tests (the complement of the probability of a Type
II error).

3.2 Demand for Credibility
It is generally agreed that a major purpose of financial statements is to
provide information which is useful in assessing a company's future cash flows
[e.g., Beaver, 1981]. It is also reasonable to assume that when top management has agency relationships with creditors and shareholders, errors in
financial statements (both historical statements and those to be delivered in the
future) will not be merely random or capricious. Rather, such errors will tend to
reflect top management's own expected utility maximizing motives, which will
typically be to inducefinancial statement users to overestimate these flows. 18
The probability that such errors are detected ex ante (before users assess the
firm's cashflows) increases with the credibility of the audit.
The cashflows of thefirm are important because the wealth of users will be
a function of such flows and any errors in their assessment. For example,
unrecorded liabilities may cause a banker to assess a downward biased
probability of the borrower's bankruptcy and hence, charge too low an interest
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rate. Or, overstated historical revenues may cause a purchaser of common
stock to pay an inflated price relative to the true value of shares. Of course, if
the error is subsequently discovered, an injured user will seek to recover his
losses from any person who, through negligence or fraud, created the error or
failed to detect and report it. But such ex post compensation is not likely to be
complete. As a result, users will value a credible audit ex ante and, ignoring the
costs of auditing, prefer more credibility to less.
In order to transform the ex ante value of credibility to users into an
effective demand for credibility by top management, it is necessary to identify a
mechanism through which costs to users from possible financial statement
errors are imposed (at least partially) ex ante on top management. A reasonable
assumption is that users of financial statements are rational and "price protect''
themselves in transactions with management. That is, they anticipate the costs
that top management, acting in its own self-interest, can impose upon them,
and adjust the terms of contracts accordingly. An extreme form of "price
protection" is refusal to transact. For example, a bank may demand a high rate
of interest on a commercial loan where the application is supported by
unauditedfinancial statements, or may simply refuse to make such a loan. Or a
prospective shareholder will submit a low bid for stock if the company's
financial statements have not been verified by a credible auditor, or may refuse
to buy such shares. Thus, under the rational user assumption, top managers
will demand credible auditing in their own interests.
The auditor's decision problem from the previous section can be extended
to provide insights into the demand for credibility. Assume a particular user
assesses the present value of a company's future cash flows, given all the
available information, including a set(s) of unaudited financial statements, as the
value, ø. 19 However, if these statements contain a material error(s), actual cash
flows will yield a lower present value of ø-w. The user's wealth is some
increasing function, g, of the firm's cash flows. Thus, the user's expected
wealth is
[1-P'(s2)]g(ø) + p'(s2)g(ø-w)
{3.1}
where p' is his assessed prior distribution on the states.
Note that a credible but costless audit can benefit the user in two ways:
1) The audit can induce a Bayesian revision of p' to a posterior distribution,
p". If p"(s2) < p'(s2), the user's expected wealth is increased.
2) If the user is risk averse, the auditor may function as an insurer against
the risk of loss of w, thus increasing the user's expected utility.
However, after assuming the risk, the auditor will himself be motivated
to minimize the insurance premium by performing an audit examination.
This will lead to a Bayesian revision of the auditor's prior, p', to a
posterior distribution, p".
In both cases, if audit credibility were costless, a perfect audit, which reduced
p"(s2) to zero, would be demanded.20
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3.3 Determinants of the Level of Credibility Demanded
However, credibility is not a free good and its cost is normally borne by the
audited company. Given the other audit service attributes, the auditor's fee for
credibility is X2c2q and for a specific company (fixed q), an increase in c 2
requires an increase in audit intensity, n. Thus, choice of credibility can be
conceptually reduced to choice of n.
The ideal way to proceed at this point would be to specify a model of the
determination of audit intensity in a multiple person setting, obtain an optimum
solution, and perform comparative static analysis to identify demand determinants. However, this approach is not possible as no such model exists.
A more restrictive but useful approach is to consider the choice of n by a
representative risk neutral user in a single-person decision setting. That is, the
user either performs the audit himself or delegates its performance to an
auditor whose interests are perfectly aligned with his own. Assume there is an
audit technology and an associated cost function, γ(n). Given p', g(w), and a
loss from Type I error, 21 all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity,
n*, can be calculated by performing a Bayesian preposterior analysis. It is well
known (e.g., see Kinney, 1975) that, in this setting, n* is an increasing function
of two key parameters of the problem, the loss from Type II error, g(w), and
the value of p'(s2). Assume the "auditor" performs this optimum examination,
receives the signal t, which indicates no material errors exist, and issues an
unqualified opinion. Then the representative user's expected wealth after the
audit is
[1-p"(s2|t,n*)]g(ø-γ(n*)) + p"(s2|t,n*)g[ø- w-γ(n*)]

{3.2}

where γ(n*) is also the auditor's fee, λ 2 c 2 q. The net gainfrom auditing, and
receiving an unqualified opinion, to the risk neutral user is {3.2} minus {3.1}.
This must be positive, since n* was computed optimally by equalizing the
marginal value of information to marginal audit cost.
This analysis suggests that users' demand for credibility will depend on two
factors:
1) the larger the lossfrom materialfinancial statement error, the higher the
level of audit service credibility demanded, and
2) the higher the prior probability users assess that thefinancial statements
will be materially in error, the higher the level of credibility demanded.
If users can price protect themselves in transactions with management, these
factors can also be expected to drive top management's demand for audit
credibility.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to consider the exact sources of the
benefits from credibility implicit in our analysis of the problem. Expression
{3.1} states that user wealth is lower in state s 2 than in s1. It is the avoidance of
this loss which drives the demand for credibility. In some cases, by detecting
material errors when they exist, an audit can simply shift a cost from users to
top management. However, in the majority of cases, when no material errors
are detected (or detected errors are corrected), an audit can overcome an
information asymmetry between management and users about the presence of
material errors in the.financial statements. This is valuable to managers whose
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statements (unknown to users) are, in fact, "fairly presented." Finally, the
knowledge that an audit will be performed can have a direct productive effect,
resolving a "moral hazard" problem [e.g., Baiman, 1982] thus reducing
agency costs in the relationship between top management and users. This will
occur if managers anticipate that a credible audit will reduce their ability to
conceal actions (e.g., shirking) that are not in the best interests of users.
In addition to these effects an audit may also have some insurance value to
risk averse users. But such a role is dubious, since auditors are not strictly
liable for losses to users; even under the most severe liability statutes, an
auditor can invoke a "due diligence" defense. However, recent court decisions
[e.g., Collins, 1985] suggest that this insurance role of auditors may be
increasing in importance.

3.4 Effect of Information Asymmetry About Audit Service
Production
If one assumes that users can observe the production function of the
auditor, hence the power of the auditor's tests and the level of credibility
delivered, any auditor could supply any level of credibility demanded by top
management.22 But this is clearly not the case. The auditor has complete
information about his production process, and top management may be able to
observe audit production imperfectly. However, users are precluded from
directly observing the performance of the audit. As stated in the last section,
this information asymmetry will cause users to rely upon the auditor's brand
name or reputation as a surrogate measure of audit service credibility. We now
develop this argument.
A possible method which could be suggested to overcome the information
asymmetry would be simple disclosure of the details of the auditor's examination. In fact, one could even argue that the current stylized claim to audit
performance "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards" is
sufficient, since the reader is informed that the auditor "did what he should
have done" in the circumstances. However, the auditor is an economic agent
who can be expected to pursue his own self-interest, and such disclosures and
claims are in themselves meaningless. This is so because the information
asymmetry is associated with a moral hazard problem between the auditor and
users. In the absence of observation, the user has no reason to believe that the
auditor has performed the examination he claims to have performed.
Note that users (as principals) can attempt to resolve this moral hazard
problem by contracting with the auditor on mutually observable information of
some sort. This approach is taken in two agent analyses of the auditing
problem, such as in Antle [1982]. However, these models are of little empirical
relevance because, in the real world, such contracting simply does not occur.
Moreover, even the terms of any contract between the top management and
the auditor are not observable to users.
Hence, because an auditor cannot directly communicate, in a meaningful
way, variations in the power of his tests and users value different levels of
credibility in different circumstances, auditors must specialize in the delivery of
credibility levels. That is, while an auditor's credibility may change over time, it
must be fixed at a moment in time across engagements. Returning to the
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fertilizer example, an auditor cannot combine different proportions of nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potash as required by users and sell these different products
in uniform, unlabeled bags!
As a result, each auditor's brand name or reputation will imply delivery of a
certain level of credibility and, at any moment, there is afixed rank ordering of
auditors based on perceived credibility. Top management's choice among
different credibility levels thus requires a choice among auditors.

3.5 Reputation Investments, Audit Failure, and Auditor
Liability
An auditor can acquire a reputation to perform audits of a certain level of
credibility through various means. For example, it is likely that he must invest
in technology, physical facilities, personnel and their knowledge, organization
control systems, etc. to efficiently produce a credibility level. Moreover, it is
reasonable to assume that efficient production of more powerful audit tests
requires a higher level of such investments. Thus users could infer the
auditor's credibility level by observing these investments directly, through
advertising, or through informal communication of various sorts. Note that
auditor specialization imposes a far lower information burden upon users than
would a need to infer varying credibility for each auditor for each audit! Note
also that the higher the level of fixed investments which are specialized to
production of a certain credibility level, the higher the relocation costs and the
more stable the auditor's brand name over time.
A potentially useful source of information about brand name is the rate of
audit failure for which an auditor is held to be liable. However, the connection is
not a direct or simple one. Consider the following descriptions of four possible
engagements:
Case 3
Case 4
Case 1
Case 2
P'(s2)
.2
.5
.5
.5
g(w)
$2
$2
$1
$1
n
n1
n2
n1
(n 2 >n 1 )
(n 3 >n 2 >n 1 )
1-β
.90
.95
.99
.90
Auditor
X
Y
Z
Z
.02
.05
.01
.09
P"(s2)
In Case #1, the user's assessment of the prior probability of material error and
the loss from such an error leads to a demand for audit credibility of 1 — β
(where β is the conditional probability of a Type II error) of .90. The user
believes this power of a test will be delivered by auditor X and, after observing
an unqualified opinion signed by auditor X, will assess a posterior probability of
undetected material error, of .02. Note that 1 -p"(s 2 ) or .98 is the user
assessed credibility of thefinancial statement package. In Case #2, since the
user assesses a higher prior probability of material error, he demands a higher
power test which, he believes, is supplied by auditor Y. Case #3, with a higher
assessed error cost, motivates a demand for a still higher level of credibility,
which the user believes is supplied by auditor Z.
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An audit failure occurs when there is actual ex post discovery of a material
error in a set of auditedfinancial statements. Note that, when auditing is costly,
a rational user anticipates this possibility whenever p"(s 2 )>0. However, if an
error is actually discovered, a user who relied on the auditor's brand name is
motivated to seek recovery of losses suffered on account of the error and may
file suit against the auditor (and top management). The auditor, on the other
hand, will raise a due diligence defense and maintain that he was not negligent
in the performance of the audit.23 If the auditor complied with generally
accepted auditing standards and obtained evidence deemed by the court to be
sufficient and appropriate in the circumstances, he will not be liable to the user.
If the user, the auditor, and the court all have homogeneous assessments of
p'(s2) and g(w), then auditors X, Y and Z should not be liable in Cases #1 to 3.
In each instance, the auditor promised to deliver a certain level of credibility
through his brand name and did so. However, in Case #4, auditor Z is expected
to deliver a test whose power is .99 but fails to perform such a test. The user
believes the posterior probability of loss is .01, but faces an actual probability of
loss of .09. If an audit failure occurs, a lawsuit isfiled, and the court agrees with
the user's parameter assessments (i.e., that a .99 audit was appropriate in the
circumstances), the auditor should be found negligent and liable to the user for
losses.24
Given this process, what rates of successful litigation can users expect to
observe with respect to auditors and what is the information conveyed by these
rates? Because of the inherent uncertainties surrounding the audit and litigation
process, the auditor's credibility level which is assessed as delivered ex post
can be viewed as a drawing from a probability distribution, whose mean is the
current credibility level associated with a brand name. Under these circumstances, the normal rate of successful litigation across all credibility levels should
be approximately uniform. Any auditor can be found negligent in supplying a
service, no matter what the exact specification of that service. Thus auditor
"hit rates" provide no information about the absolute or relative (across
auditors) powers of auditors' tests as such. However, if an auditor experiences
an unusually high "hit rate" during a period, this may be evidence that he is
reducing his delivered credibility level to a lower value. That is, the rate
provides information about deterioration (intentional or unintentional) of the
auditor's reputation. Conversely, if the auditor experiences an unusually low
rate, this may be evidence that he has increased the power of his tests beyond
expected levels and is repositioning his brand name by investing in reputation.

3.6 Implications of the Analysis for Auditor Behavior
An auditor's brand name or reputation is the basis on which users predict
the level of credibility he will deliver. A wealth maximizing auditor can be
expected to position his brand in the market seeking to maximize his monopoly
rents. That is, he will seek a niche where there is high demand and few
competitors. In addition, if there are sunk costs associated with a particular
credibility level, his return on these immovable investments is a quasi-rent
[Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978]. To protect his rents an auditor is
motivated to maintain intertemporal stability in his delivered credibility level.
Other things being equal, the higher the rents, the greater the motivation to
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maintain the level of service [Klein and Leffler, 1981]. However, note that rents
can exist at any credibility level in the market.
It is useful to contrast this result with De Angelo's claim, discussed in
Section 1, that larger audit firms will report more truthfully than smaller firms
for fear of losing their larger aggregate quasi-rents. Note that De Angelo
focuses on the second aspect of credibility, that an auditor will report his findings
honestly, rather than the probability of discovery of errors in audit testing which
is the focus of our analysis. This is an important difference because an auditor
who fails to report a known material error commits a fraudulent act, not mere
negligence. Penalties for fraud, if discovered, tend to be severe no matter what
the circumstances. In particular, potential penalties an auditor faces personally,
such as a jail sentence and loss of certification and license to practice, probably
override any concerns with rents. Thus, one can reasonably argue that the
probability of deliberate misrepresentation by auditors is constant, regardless
of the auditor's brand name. However, a reporting issue may well arise when
the criteria determining what constitutes an error and/or materiality are
ambiguous. These situations require the exercise of professional judgment and
the ability to make decisions deemed to be "correct" ex post can vary among
auditors. Such abilities can readily be encompassed in the concept of power of
test and hence auditor brand name.
Returning to De Angelo, our analysis then differs from hers in two basic
ways. First, her focus on the probability of misrepresentation as the element of
credibility on which auditfirms differ casts an unnecessarily pejorative tone on
product differentiation. Second, she makes an extreme assumption about
relocation alternatives—namely, if an auditor is caught cheating, he will lose his
other clients. Thus her quasi-rents from multi-period pricing motivate stability
of location, but the auditor's choice is simply the current location (which is a
mechanistic function of audit firm size) and being out of the market! By
contrast, in our analysis, the prospect of earning monopoly rents motivates an
auditor's brand name location while the desire to maintain monopoly rents and
quasi-rents from any immovable resources motivates an auditor to remain in
that location over time.
To summarize and illustrate these ideas, consider how auditors are
expected to match-up with a set of available clients. Assume three companies
where users value low, medium, and high levels of auditor credibility,
respectively, and three auditors (X, Y and Z) exist. Assume the auditors agree
with user assessment of p'(s2) and g(w) and hence with the power of tests
appropriate in each situation. Also, the auditors have homogeneous production
functions and can produce the three levels of auditing for $100, $200, and $300,
respectively. The possible auditor-company pairings are shown below:
Auditor
X

Credibility Demanded
Low
Medium
$100
$200

High
$300

Y

$100

$200

$300

Z

$100

$200

$300
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Assume audit services are differentiated but an auditor can "tailor" an
examination to the demands of users through explicit contracting. Now if the
audits were put up for bid, each auditor's bid would at least cover his costs for
each client and, in a competitive setting, auditor choice would be indeterminate.
Now assume auditors have brand names in the eyes of users where X —
low, Y — medium, Z — high. The bids on the main diagonal are clearly
acceptable to users. However, the upper right hand off-diagonal bids are not
acceptable because the production process is not observable. Moreover, even
if auditors are liable for negligence, these bids are still not acceptable so long as
users value credibility ex ante because litigation is not a perfect substitute for
loss prevention (i.e., users do not expect full loss recoveryfrom the auditor).
The off-diagonal bids at the lower left are somewhat more problematic.
Given the brand names, the bids are acceptable to users, who would appear to
be receiving afree goodfrom auditors Y and Z. Moreover, since auditors agree
with users as to the power of tests appropriate in the circumstances, there is
no expected auditor liability problem! The difficulty here arises from the
assumption that production functions are homogeneous. If, in fact, there are
fixed costs of producing a particular credibility level and higher credibility
production is associated with higherfixed costs, then these off-diagonal bids
would tend to be higher, for a given company, than those on the main diagonal.
Thus auditor choice would be determined consistent with the perceived brand
name.
Finally, note that in this example since there is only one auditor appropriate
for each company, auditors will earn monopoly rents. However, in general,
there can be many auditors at a particular location in the limit driving monopoly
rents to zero [see Rosen, 1974].

3.7 An Alternative View: Credibility As a Posterior Probability
In previous subsections, auditor credibility has been identified with the
power of the auditor's tests. An alternative possibility is to associate it with the
posterior probability of financial statement error, or 1 -p"(s 2 ). Note that this
corresponds with what has previously been labeled the credibility of the
financial statement package. This alternative view is attractive because it
assumes that users care about the possibility of financial statement errors and
their consequences, but not about the separate contributions of the auditor and
top management. Consistent with this assumption, auditors may be liable for all
undetected materialfinancial statement errors, but users still value credibility
ex ante because expected loss recovery is not complete. In this setting, an
auditor's brand name would imply a level of 1-p"(s 2 ). That is, different
auditors would be associated with a different posterior probability that the
financial statements were erroneous. However, the Bayesian revision would be
performed only by the auditor; users would be concerned only with p"(s2). In
effect, the user delegates to the auditor the responsibility for performing tests
consistent with various prior probabilities of error.
The demand for different levels of 1-p"(s 2 ) can be derived from the
different dollar (or utility) consequences users face in different circumstances.
That is, the greater is g(w), the higher the level of credibility demanded. Since
auditor tests and p"(s2) are not observable directly, users must still rely upon
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the auditor's brand name which must be assessed from various sources of
information, including advertising, levels of fixed investment, etc. However,
the rate of successful litigation against an auditor can now be associated more
directly with a brand name.
As before, an auditor is motivated to deliver 1 -p"(s 2 ) consistent with his
brand name to preserve rents at that location. However, since auditors are
liable for all undetected errors, the "hit rate" observed will be a proxy for
p"(s2). Note that each auditor expects to incur a particular "hit rate" and such
rates are expected to vary. But since auditing is costly, so long as there are
variations in dollar consequences, variations in auditor credibility and "hit
rates" are desirable from an economic point of view. Again, being a low
credibility auditor does not have pejorative implications! If auditors in this
situation were allowed to invoke a negligence defense, then the above
implications would still go through, so long as the success of such defenses
were randomly distributed across auditors and engagements.
While this alternative view of auditor credibility seems to capture certain
aspects of reality (e.g., the delegation for responsibility to the auditor) better
than when credibility is identified with the power of the auditor's tests, both
scenarios have essentially the same implications for auditor choice.

3.8 Auditor Choice by Top Management
In the previous section we identified three audit service characteristics,
control (c1), credibility (c2), and product line (c3), which top management may
value. Levels of control and product line will be demanded through management's desire to maximize corporate profits or firm value as a determinant of
management's own compensation. Since there is no conflict between users and
management with respect to these two characteristics, the choice can be
expected to be optimalfrom both groups' point of view.
There is a conflict between users and management with respect to auditor
credibility, and management can be expected to make an optimal choice, given
its own interests. However, if users are rational and price protect themselves
when transacting with management, this choice can be expected to at least
directionally reflect users' demand determinants.
Formally, top management's problems of choosing an optimum set of audit
service characteristics for a period can be described as follows:
Max
Ө[ø(c1,c2,c3) - wp"(s2|c2) - F(c1,c2,c3)]
{3.3}
(c1c2c3)
s.t.
c1 - k(c2) = 0
where Ө is some benefit function to top management and F is the audit fee
function. Note that the audit service determines an expected present value of
net cashflows to the firm as perceived by financial statement users. If users
are "price protected'' then top management expects to gainfrom the purchase
of credibility. Also, a constraint is included to recognize that control and
credibility are likely to be joint products in production and hence not
independent in the audit fee function.

92

Management's solution to this problem determines an optimum characteristics vector, (c1*, c2*, c3*). However, there is no guarantee that this vector of
characteristics will be available in the market since, we have argued, production
of all three characteristics likely involves fixed costs. Thus, the final step will
be a choice of the specific auditor who minimizes opportunity cost (i.e., the
"transportation cost") associated with the suboptimal choice.

3.9 Illustrative Example
To illustrate some of the ideas concerning auditor choice developed in this
section, consider the simple case of a company with no debt solely owned by a
100 percent owner and manager who wishes to sell 50 percent of his common
shares to an outsider or "user" who will assume an active role in future
management. (That is, no external agency relationship is created. The situation
when a new agency relationship arises is examined subsequently.) Assume the
company has been in business for one year and the owner has prepared a set of
unauditedfinancial statements which show a net operating cashflow of $10,000
for the year. The user is risk neutral and has an opportunity rate of return on
investment of 10 percent. Assume that the user believes the company's cash
flows will follow a random walk in perpetuity. Thus, the best point estimate of
future cash flows is simply the level earned last year.
If the user knows thefinancial statements to be accurate, the assessed
value of thefirm will be $100,000 and the user should be willing to pay up to
$50,000 for a 50 percent interest. However, this is not likely to be the case.
Rather, the user will recognize that the owner-manager has an incentive to
overstate the reported cashflows of thefirm, but not all owner-managers will
necessarily do so. If thefinancial statements are in fact erroneous (assume the
true cash flows were only $8,000 last year), the true value of the firm is
$80,000.
Suppose the user assesses a prior probability of .3 that the financial
statements are in error. Since the user can price protect himself through his
offering price for the shares, it would appear that he would be willing to pay no
more than 50 percent of the expected value, or $47,000. Since the manager
who prepared thefinancial statements knows their true state, he knows that
this price is too high. Thus, he would gladly accept the offer of $47,000 if the
statements were erroneous, but would reject it if the statements were correct
and auditor credibility was available to convince the user of their truthfulness.
Assume, for the moment, that the statements do not contain material
errors. Suppose an optimum audit, which maximizes {3.3}, costs $3,000 and
induces a Bayesian revision of probabilities by the userfrom p'(s2) = .3 to
p"(s2) = .1. Such an optimum audit implies an optimum level of credibility, or
c2*, purchased by the manager or (suppressing c1 and c3)
max .5[$100,000 - $20,000 p"(Si|c2) - F(c2)] =
.5[$100,000 - $20,000 (.1) - $3,000] = $95,000.
Note that Ө = .5 in this case is thefraction of equity being sold to the user.
Thus, if thefinancial statements are correct and the auditor cannot commit a
type I error, he will issue an unqualified opinion. Having seen this opinion and
the identity of the auditor, the user is willing to pay up to $47,500 for the
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shares. Since the user is price protected both with or without the audit, it is the
manager who gainsfrom the purchase of credibility.
Returning to the question of the appropriate offering price if there is no
audit, consider the transaction in a market context. Suppose, for example, that
ten investment opportunities of identical characteristics are available to the
user. Furthermore, his prior probability of error is correct in the sense that
three managers have overstated their reported cashflows while seven have not
done so. If the user, without seeing an audit, offers to purchase a 50 percent
interest in somefirm at $47,000, he can be certain that only a manager who
misrepresented his cashflows will accept! Thus, he would not, in fact, offer
$47,000, but only $40,000. At this price he will be fully protected against loss
and managers whosefinancial statements are correct will be motivated to
purchase auditor credibility, as described above. Thus, in a market context,
where there are many similar potential users, there will be a distribution of
auditor - client pairings, with perhaps some managers, who misrepresented
their cashflows, purchasing no auditor credibility.
This example illustrates only one possible situation in which auditor
credibility is valued by managers. The case is referred to in the literature as an
"adverse selection problem" [e.g., Baiman, 1982] and credibility here serves
as a signal of a manager's honesty, which itself is exogeneously given.
However, since the user is fully price protected against manager misrepresentation, auditor credibility may also change the reporting behavior of a manager.
For example, since the manager whose statements are unfair has fooled no one
in this illustration, he may be motivated to correct existing errors and submit to
a credible audit to increase the selling price of the shares.
Now consider the same situation, except that the user does not intend to
assume an active role in the management of thefirm, but will retain the former
owner as the manager. Thus an agency relationship, and an attendant moral
hazard problem arises. To forecast future cashflows as simply a continuation of
the historicalflow (either $10,000 or $8,000) would be naive, since the future
agency costs which can be expected to result from the manager's reduced
ownership interest in the firm are being ignored. Given the manager's known
future trade-off between firm value and perquisite consumption, assume the
user forecasts maximum agency costs to be $1,000 per year.
In the absence of the agency relationship, the user would have assessed a
prior probability of error of p'(s2) = .3. However, knowing that the agency
relationship will be created, we argue that the user is likely to assess a higher
prior probability that thefinancial statements are erroneous. This is so because
it is in the manager's interest to try to induce the user to bear some or all of the
future agency costs through an initial overvaluation of thefirm. Moreover, the
larger the expected future agency costs, the larger the difference between the
true and reported cashflows is likely to be. Returning to the example, if the
manager still reports $10,000 and the user believes cashflows could have been
$8,000 with a probability of p'(s2)= .4, he will offer ½[($8,000 - $1,000) ÷
.1] = $35,000. Again, managers who have not misrepresented their cash flows
are motivated to hire auditors of appropriate (and relative to the previous case,
higher) credibility. Conversely, given the user's complete price protection,
managers who have initially misrepresented their cashflows may be motivated
to change their reporting and purchase a credible audit.
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Finally, in this case, if the user views a credible audit now as a commitment
that such audits will continue to be obtained in the future, he may reduce the
amount of his forecasted future agency costs below $1,000. This is so because
a credible audit prevents (imperfectly) managers from concealing the effects of
such behavior (e.g., shirking, consuming excess perquisites, etc.) by overstat
ing the cash flows reported in future financial statements. Depending upon the
manager's utility trade-off between firm value now and the present value of
future perquisite consumption, it may be optimal for the manager to commit to
such future audits, thereby increasing the selling price of the shares.

IV. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we have analyzed the nature of differentiated audit services
and the determinants of auditor choice. The perspective on the audit services
market developed here differs significantly from the typical textbook view of
auditing where any auditor can do anything, and also, we believe, from the
conventional thinking of auditing practitioners and academics. Two conclusions
in particular should be emphasized: First, we have argued that differentiation on
an auditor credibility dimension arises from differences in demand which are
themselves a function of differences in company characteristics. Thus, a
ranking of audit firms on a credibility dimension has no pejorative implications.
Second, given such differences in demand and auditor location, we expect to
observe a relatively stable distribution of auditor-client pairs which reflects the
optimum decisions of top management under existing circumstances. As we
have seen, both the relationship between top management, the auditor, and
financial statement users, and the characteristics of the audit service are quite
complex. Our objective has been to develop a logical structure for this complex
reality as a basis for understanding different auditor choices by top manage
ments of different companies.

End Notes
1. Note that in his study of Australian audit fees, Francis [1984] found no evidence of lowballing. Also, while De Angelo demonstrates that "low balling" in first period bids is an equilibrium
strategy in a world of certainty, it is not obvious that this bidding strategy is necessarily an
equilibrium under uncertainty. However, even if low-balling does occur, the "strength" of the
collateral bond will decrease over time as the initial fee discount is recovered through quasi-rents.
Since auditor-client pairings tend to be long-lived (about 20 years on average), the motivational
impact of the residual collateral bonds that will exist at any moment in time is not obvious.
2. Let q denote the quantity of product of the i firm and p denote the price of the product of
the j firm, then the cross elasticity coefficient is
t h

i

j

t h

n = (∂q /q )/(∂p /p )
ij

i

i

j

j

where q = f(p) is the demand function faced by firm i and p = (p .. .p ) is the vector of prices for
the products of the m firms in the industry.
3. However, as noted earlier, there is a further complicating factor in such studies in that an
audit fee is not a simple price, but rather the product of price times quantity of service purchased.
4. The standard assumption is that managers' utility functions include both wealth and effort as
arguments. Managers are assumed to derive utility from wealth and disutility from effort.
However, auditors and their services do not enter directly into the utility function.
5. The agency relationship has a long history as a form of social interaction. Ross [1973]
characterizes the agency relationship as arising "between two (or more) parties when one,
designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the
i

i

1
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m

principal, in a particular domain of decision problems." Because the agent is himself an expected
utility maximizing individual, it is unrealistic to assume that he will always necessarily act so as to
maximize the expected utility of the principal. However, the principal can limit the divergence of
interests by establishing incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs. Likewise the
agent may incur bonding costs to guarantee to the principal that he will not take certain actions. But
these mechanisms are unlikely to perfectly align the divergent interests of the principal and
agent(s)—it is, in fact, unlikely to be optimal to try to do so—with the result that there will still be
some residual loss. Note, however, that the expanded opportunity set which the agency
relationship allows must yield a net benefit to the principal (and perhaps the agent), else the
relationship would simply not arise [see Jensen and Meckling, 1976].
6. In addition to this potential "asset substitution" problem, Smith and Warner [1979] list
three other sources of conflict between an owner-manager and debtholders:
1) dividend payment—increasing dividend payout after the debt issuance (in the extreme,
paying a liquidating dividend to shareholders, leaving the debtholders with a worthless claim).
2) claim dilution—unexpectedly issuing additional debt of equal or higher priority after the
current debt issuance.
3) underinvestment—refusing to invest in positive net present value projects whose
primary benefit accrues to the bondholders.
7. While only 15 percent of the companies voluntarily purchased a full audit, another 69 percent
purchased either a review or compilation service, which are lower cost partial substitutes for the
audit service. Moreover, as with the audit, the primary and secondary reasons given (with
essentially the same frequencies) for the purchase of these audit substitutes were "control'' and
"credibility."
8. In this data set, consulting services were defined to include any non-audit service except
corporate tax work (i.e., return preparation, planning, etc.).
9. Throughout this monograph, the term "client'' refers to the top management of a company.
10. A complete discussion of the exact nature of audit credibility is deferred until Section 3.
11. More precisely, it is the purchase of the best form of audit opinion (i.e., unqualified,
qualified, or adverse) which management can expect given the characteristics of the financial
statements being audited.
12. A related question is—how does the model compare to the way audit fees are ostensibly
determined in practice? Audit services not performed under afixed fee arrangement are normally
billed using a set of hourly rates for the various grades of professional labor utilized. Even with a
fixed fee, the amount bid can be conceived as a function of expected labor usage and the billing rate
structure. But this process only defines a "standard fee" or upper bound on the amount collected.
The standard fee may be discounted for a variety of reasons including perceived inefficiencies in
labor usage, because the job utilizes resources which would otherwise be idle or underemployed,
or under the pressure of competition. In addition, of course, the process through which standard
billing rates are set is not known, hence the (billing rate x time) model is not a particularly useful
way to view the process of audit fee determination.
13. Product scope would be measured by the expertise of thefirm in supplying various types of
consulting services. At a moment in time, the total level of suchfirm expertise isfixed. Note that it
is thefixed costs associated with maintaining an expertise level for sale as needed which will cause
the implicit price of scope (λ 3 ) to be positive. However, only certain subsets of the total service
package may be relevant and therefore priced to certain subsets of clients. For example, the ability
to design and install computerized hospital accounting systems will be relevant to some clients but
irrelevant to others. Hence, an auditfirm may simultaneously offer different levels of c 3 to different
types of companies.
14. The offering of "near audit services," such as reviews and compilations, by public
accounting firms represents an attempt to reduce client opportunity losses in this situation.
15. The criterion of optimality normally used is whether the sum of consumer's surplus plus
producers' excess profits is maximized [Schmalensee, 1978]. In an auditing context, consumer
surplus can be interpreted in the normal way except that the demand curve is derived from top
management's objective function.
16. Auditors frequently distinguish between "errors," which are mechanistically caused by
deficiencies infinancial reporting systems, and "irregularities," which are the result of intentional
attempts to bias, conceal, or otherwise misrepresentfinancial information. We make no distinction
between these situations. However, it has been suggested that optimum audit program design,
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given the possible presence of "irregularities," must recognize the gaming nature of the situation
[Fellingham and Newman, 1985].
17. This is essentially the audit risk model proposed by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants [CICA, 1980].
18. Auditors have long recognized that the greatest risk with respect to the financial
statements of publicly held companies (and companies with significant debt) is that assets, and
hence net income, are overstated. The reasonableness of this concern was confirmed by St. Pierre
and Anderson's [1984] study of 129 lawsuitsfiled against auditors in the U.S. during the 1960's and
1970's. Of the 334 alleged errors in these suits "none. . .concerned errors in undervaluing assets,
recognizing inadequate amounts of revenue, or recognizing excessive expenses" (p. 242).
19. To focus on the essential auditing aspects of the problem, assume a world of certainty,
except for the state of thefinancial statements.
20. This statement assumes that the audit evidence indicates that no material errors exist.
Presumably, if top management knew that a perfect audit would be performed, they would not
attempt to deceive users. However, if this were not the case, the perfect audit still would resolve
all uncertainty. Knowing that p"(s2) = 1, users could behave accordingly.
21. If the user falsely rejects the null hypothesis that thefinancial statements do not contain
material errors, he may choose not to transact with top management or may request contract
terms which will not be acceptable to management. In either case, the user loses whatever net
benefits were available to him in the "trade."
22. Assuming the auditor was technically capable of performing an audit of the company—given
its size, complexity, geographic dispersion of operations, etc.; that is, he can deliver the required q,
efficiently. Also, efficient production of higher levels of credibility may require higher fixed costs.
This is discussed in Section 3.5.
23. This is, in fact, his "worst case" defense under statutes such as the Securities Act of
1933. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and probably under common law appealing to
the Ultramares decision, the auditor can claim a mere absence of gross negligence orfraud as his
defense.
24. For what amount of damages should the auditor be liable? In principal, since the auditor
increased the user expected loss by $.16 through his negligence, this should be the amount of
damages assessed each time the auditor is negligent. However, not all instances of negligence are
likely to be discovered ex post. While negligence by the auditor increases the probability of
undetected material error (e.g., from .01 to .09 in case #4), negligence need not result in an actual
audit failure. For example, assume auditor Z performs 100 audits in a given year (such as case #4)
where users expect .99 credibility but only .90 is delivered. Users expect three audit failures and
losses of $6. However, suppose nine audit failures occur causing losses of $18. Users will
presumably seek damages of $18 but only $12 should be awarded, else the auditor is being
implicitly held to a perfect audit standard. Conversely, if users are only awarded the increase in
expected loss in each casefiled or $.16 x 9 = $1.44, they are grossly undercompensated. How
much would actually be awarded is, of course, an open question but there is no apparent mechanism
which would motivate a court to award the correct amount of $12.
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